On30 July 2019, IKM has been successfully awarded by HSRCC (HighSpeed Railway Contractor Consortium) for the most remarkable commercial project located in Bandung area : Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail. IKM's contractual scope includes the whole EPC works for HSRCC headquarter base camp, steel structure workshop, landscape etc. SemuaKarir dan Lowongan di HIGH SPEED RAILWAY CONTRACTOR CONSORTIUM 13; Lowongan Jurnalis/Editor; Semua Lowongan; English Translator. Gaji: 6.000.000 - 10.000.000 IDR . HIGH SPEED RAILWAY CONTRACTOR CONSORTIUM 13 Jawa Barat . Ditayangkan 6 Mei 2022 . Deskripsi Pekerjaan . 1. Egyptbased contractor Orascom Construction and its consortium partners Siemens Mobility and The Arab Contractors have signed a contract with the National Authority for Tunnels (NAT) to expand the network of Egypt's new high-speed rail system to 2,000 kilometres.. The consortium had signed the first phase of the network covering a 660km line in September 2021. MANDARIN- BAHASA INDONESIA TRANSLATOR-High Speed Railway Contractor Consortium (CRSC) Jakarta Raya | Ditayangkan: 27-December-2019 | Tutup pada 26-January-2020. HighSpeed Railway Contractor Consortium adalah konsorsium yang dibentuk untuk melaksanakan pembangunan proyek Kereta Cepat Jakarta-Bandung. Konsorsium ini terdiri atas 7 (Tujuh) perusahaan yang memiliki keahlian di bidangnya. Beberapa perusahaan bertugas sebagai kontraktor dari konstruksi sipil, sedangkan lainnya bertugas sebagai Site De Rencontre À Dakar Gratuit. [1/2] An electric Multiple Unit high-speed train is seen during Hot Sliding Test in Tegalluar, Bandung, West Java province, Indonesia, May 19, 2023, in this photo taken by Antara Foto. Antara Foto/Raisan Al Farisi/via REUTERS JAKARTA, June 7 Reuters - Indonesia's transport ministry and three consultants have pushed back on a China-funded consortium's plan to start full commercial operations of the country's $ billion first high-speed train service in August, an internal document flagship project of President Joko Widodo - and part of China's Belt and Road Initiative BRI - the 142 km 88 miles line from capital Jakarta to the large city of Bandung being built by a consortium of Indonesian and Chinese state firms is already $ billion over the initial budget and four years behind smooth opening of the railway line, the most high-profile BRI project in Southeast Asia's largest economy, as part of Independence Day celebrations would be a shot in the arm for its ruling party ahead of a general election next year, analysts said."A further delay will only become ammunition for the opposition to attack," said Teuku Rezasyah, an international relations analyst at Padjadjaran University, adding that setbacks would taint China's credibility to develop and deliver big projects in the before its proposed commercial launch in August, the showpiece project is beset by fresh problems, with the consortium's Chinese participants wanting a full operational worthiness certificate for the line despite an incomplete station, a 48-page presentation reviewed by Reuters the transport ministry and consultants Mott MacDonald, PwC and local law firm Umbra have suggested that full-fledged commercial operations could start in January 2024, the "Progress Update" report dated May 14 shows."There is a risk that the target of commercial operations in August could be delayed to complete all construction by December 31," said the report, written in the local restructuring at PT Wijaya Karya Tbk WIKA - an Indonesian state-owned construction firm with an indirect minority stake in the consortium - is also hitting the working capital needs of the project, which has already accumulated at least $ million in outstanding payments, another internal document corporate secretary Mahendra Vijaya said the company had the financial capacity to finish the remaining work, but it also needed the consortium to pay it for work already is negotiating with China on an additional $560 million loan and asking for an interest rate of for the portion of the loan in yuan, which is lower than the China Development Bank CDB offer of according to a second set of documents dated May possibility of a further delay and other details in the two documents have not been previously Hario Seto, a senior official with the investment coordinating ministry, said debt negotiations were underway with CDB, focused on the interest railway plans to begin a free trial with passengers in mid-August, with paid trips expected in September and the incomplete station likely finished by November, he embassy in Jakarta directed questions on the date of operation and the issuance of certificate to the Indonesian government."Currently, the project is undergoing integrated test and commissioning," an embassy spokesperson said on declined to comment. China-backed consortium PT KCIC, Mott MacDonald, Umbra, CDB did not respond to requests for AND DOUBTSThe fresh loan is needed to help cover a $ billion cost KCIC was awarded the project in 2015 after lodging a cheaper proposal than a Japanese rival, with completion expected in 2019. But the project has been plagued by delays due to land ownership disputes, questions over its economic impact and the COVID-19 and cost blowouts are not uncommon in high-speed rail projects globally, including in Western KCIC expects it will take 40 years for its investment to become profitable, twice as long as initial estimates, an executive said last tickets on the line will cost up to 350,000 rupiah $ depending on the distance travelled, according to PT KCIC, nearly a quarter of the average Indonesian's weekly planned 45-minute train ride between Jakarta and Bandung compares with a car journey of two to three hours or the current three-hour rail with the terminal stations located outside the city centres, the high-speed rail line could struggle to attract the business passengers being targeted, said Sutanto Soehodho, a transportation analyst at the University of Indonesia."They value time and seek convenience," he said. "But if they need to transit again, why should they use it?"Locating the stations in central Jakarta and Bandung would have been too costly, ministry official Seto said.$1 = 14, rupiahReporting by Stefanno Sulaiman; Writing by Devjyot Ghoshal; Editing by Jamie FreedOur Standards The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles. Rome, June 6 Reuters - A Webuild-led consortium has won a tender worth billion euros $ billion to build a section of a new high-speed railway line in Sicily, the Italian construction group said on leads the consortium with a 75% stake, while Italian partner Ghella holds the remaining 25%.Under the contract, the consortium will build 30 kilometres of railway between Palermo and Catania - the two main cities in Sicily, an island that has long suffered from poor transport said the new line would cut travel times between Palermo and Catania from three hours to contract announced on Tuesday was awarded by Rete Ferroviaria Italiana RFI, part of state-controlled railways group Gruppo Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane.$1 = eurosReporting by Federica Urso, editing by Alvise Armellini and Jason NeelyOur Standards The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles. Connect 6ix will operate and maintain the Ontario Line for 30 years. The Ontario Line will be a new rapid transit line with 15 stations. Credit Sophia Hilmar from Pixabay. Infrastructure Ontario and Metrolinx have selected Connect 6ix team to design, construct, finance, operate and maintain the Ontario Line Rolling Stock, Systems, Operations, and Maintenance RSSOM package. This contract is valued at C$9bn $ including C$ $ for capital costs. The remaining C$ $5bn will be used for short-term construction financing and transaction costs, train costs, and 30-year operations and maintenance, lifecycle, and long-term financing. The Connect 6ix team includes the applicant lead, Plenary Americas, Hitachi Rail, Webuild Group Salini Impreglio Canada Holding, and Transdev Canada, as well as design teams such as Hitachi Rail and IBI Group Professional Services Canada. It also includes the construction teams Hitachi Rail, Webuild Group Astaldi Canada Design & Construction and Impreglio Civil Works, and NGE Contracting. The operations, maintenance, and rehabilitation team comprises Hitachi Rail and Transdev Canada, while National Bank Financial and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking are the financial advisers. Connect 6ix will start operating and maintaining the Ontario Line for a 30-year term following the completion of all the civil infrastructure elements and systems from the Ontario Line North and South segments. The new rapid transit line will operate between the Ontario Science Centre and Exhibition/Ontario Place in Toronto. It will have 15 stations, including six interchange stations. It is said to offer 40 connections to other subways, buses, streetcar, light-rail transit, and regional rail services. Basic Information Name Jakarta–Bandung High-Speed RailwayLocation Jakarta to Bandung, West Java Province, IndonesiaType of Project TransportationProject Developers PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia China KCIC, a 60–40 joint venture between a consortium of Indonesian state-owned enterprises SOEs through PT Pilar Sinergi BUMN PSBI and a consortium of Chinese SOEs through Beijing Yawan HSR Co. Ltd. PSBI comprises PT Wijaya Karya, PT Perkebunan Nusantara VIII, PT Kereta Api Indonesia, and PT Jasa Yawan HSR comprises China Railway International Co. Ltd a subsidiary of China State Railway Group Co. Ltd, CR, China Railway Group Limited known as CREC, Sinohydro Corporation Limited a subsidiary of Power Construction Corporation of China, CRRC Corporation Limited CRRC, and China Railway Signal and Communication Corporation CRSC. Main Contractors High-Speed Railway Contractor Consortium HSRCC, a consortium between Indonesian company PT Wijaya Karya 30% and several Chinese companies 70%, including China Railway International Co. Ltd, CREC, Sinohydro Corporation Limited, China Railway Design Corporation another subsidiary of CR, CRRC Sifang Co. Ltd a subsidiary of CRRC, and Financiers China Development BankCost billion USD estimate as of 2021, from an initial estimate of billion USDProject Status Under construction Project Outline The idea of a fast train project in Indonesia dates back to 2011, when the Japanese International Cooperation Agency JICA together with the Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning Bappenas carried out a feasibility study for a possible Jakarta–Surabaya HSR, the first phase of which would connect Jakarta to Bandung. The Jakarta–Surabaya medium–high-speed railway was listed as a priority project in 2013. The original plan did not explicitly mention the Jakarta–Bandung HSR, but it suggested the Jakarta–Cirebon route via Bandung section would be prioritised in part due to its higher economic internal rate of return. However, when President Joko Widodo Jokowi came to power in 2014, he shelved the plan to build the railway and reallocated the budget to development projects outside Java. Much to the surprise of everyone, not least the Japanese, in March 2015, Jokowi asked both Japan and China to bid for the Jakarta–Bandung section of the railway. In September 2015, both countries presented their proposals, which were relatively balanced. The Japanese proposed five stations along a 140-kilometre track that is part of the Jakarta–Cirebon route, while the Chinese side planned eight stations along a 150-kilometre track. Though China had a higher interest rate of 2% compared with Japan’s China offered a longer maturity period for the loan 50 years as opposed to 40 years, a shorter time frame for completion of the project, and waived the state guarantee. After a fierce bidding war between China and Japan over the project, which China won, Indonesian Minister of State-Owned Enterprises Rini Soemarno was given a mandate to determine the fate of the railway, including the establishment of the joint-venture company to lead the project. In September 2015, a state-owned fast train consortium was formed, named PT Indonesia China Fast Train or Kereta Cepat Indonesia China, KCIC. KCIC is a consortium of Indonesian and Chinese SOEs. Indonesia is represented by PT Pilar Sinergi BUMN Indonesia PSBI, a consortium of four SOEs—namely, PT Wijaya Karya 38%, active in construction, PT Jasa Marga 12%, toll road builder, PT Kereta Api Indonesia 25%, railways, and PT Perkebunan Nusantara VIII 25%, plantations. Meanwhile, the Chinese side is represented by a consortium led by Beijing Yawan HSR Co. Ltd, which comprises China Railway International Co. Ltd, CREC, Sinohydro Corporation Limited a subsidiary of Power Construction Corporation of China, China Railway Design Corporation, CRRC Corporation Limited, and China Railway Signal & Communication Corporation. The initial deal included debt financing from the China Development Bank CDB—for 75% of the total billion USD cost—which was granted with a 10-year grace period and a 2% interest rate for the dollar-denominated loan. The remaining 25% of the project’s cost will be funded by equity provided by KCIC. After the establishment of KCIC, the railway route was revised. The train was expected to reduce the 142-kilometre trip between Jakarta and Bandung from three hours to less than 40 minutes, with a maximum speed of 350 km/h. Four main stations are planned along the route Halim East Jakarta, Karawang West Java, Walini West Java, and Tegalluar West Java. Project Developer Project Contractor Soon after the establishment of KCIC, the ground-breaking ceremony for the Jakarta–Bandung HSR was held in Walini, West Java Province, in the presence of President Jokowi, on 21 January 2016. However, the project was already embroiled in controversy, with critics expressing concerns over the risk of default and the irregularities in the concession of the building permit. Then Transport Minister Ignasius Jonan did not attend the ceremony, and instead became one of the staunchest critics of the project. On 26 January, Jonan revealed that he had not issued the railway infrastructure operation permit as his ministry was still waiting for the required documents and negotiating basic terms for the concession agreement with KCIC. Despite the lack of permits and support from key ministries and lawmakers, in late January 2016, Jokowi issued a regulation containing a list of about 200 strategic projects including the HSR, signalling the strong backing of and attention from his office for this project. Many pundits believe that by backing the project, Jokowi was attempting to build his political legitimacy, with the project connecting the two largest metropolitan areas and located in the most populated province in Indonesia, cementing Jokowi’s claim to be the country’s Infrastructure Father’. From this point of view, China’s initial commitment to complete the project before 2019 was critical to Jokowi’s government as it provided the president with political capital for his campaign for re-election that year. After several delays, including a stoppage owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, construction of the railway fell way behind schedule. As of December 2020, the project was said to be 64% complete. In April 2021, Indonesian media quoted senior management at KCIC as saying the project would be operational by the end of 2022. In May 2021, President Jokowi inspected the project during his visit to West Java Province and announced the project was 73% complete, with trial runs expected to commence at the end of 2022. Source Drawn by the author. Project Impacts Land The delay in loan disbursement was one of the main factors that impeded construction of the HSR from 2016 to 2018, due to inadequate preparation in the land acquisition According to local nongovernmental organisation NGO Indonesian Forum for the Environment Walhi, project construction has caused flooded roads, landslides, and damaged houses in part due to shoddy management and poor environmental protection procedures. As the planned route of the railway cuts through important water catchment areas, mountainous regions, and agricultural areas, the project has also impacted water supplies and caused environmental stress to the surrounding impact Due to poor preparation and multiple technical challenges, the project has incurred cost overruns. In 2017, the budget swelled from billion USD to billion USD. Economists and policymakers have questioned the viability of the project, worrying it will drag Indonesia into a debt trap. Employment and labour rights The project was expected to create 39,000 jobs—both casual and permanent—during its three-year construction phase, but no data are available to show whether this promise has been fulfilled. Meanwhile, for its operation, KCIC is set to offer 2,400 local jobs and the recruitment process was under way as of April 2021. The Jakarta–Bandung HSR has led to various concerns regarding the financial sustainability of the KCIC and Indonesian SOEs in general. With Indonesian finance accounting for a major share of total investment in the project 60%, economists and policymakers voiced concerns about whether the country was at high risk of falling into debt distress. This was especially so because the Indonesian SOEs joining the consortium are debt-heavy entities and, before the inception of KCIC, were already struggling to meet their repayment obligations. To develop these major projects, the SOEs are frontloaded with debt and will only get cash flow back years into the future, which is why delays are so costly. Some Members of Parliament called on the government to halt the project amid increased concerns that a bailout would be necessary should KCIC default on its debt. In particular, Prabowo Subianto, a challenger to Jokowi’s presidency during the 2019 general election, built his campaign on the claim that Indonesia’s economic shortfalls were due to Chinese exploitation, and he even staged a protest against the HSR. As part of the campaign, Prabowo’s team promised to renegotiate—if not cancel—the project, claiming that Indonesia must get a better deal’, given that Chinese investment had eroded national interests. During the COVID-19 pandemic, pundits and the media regularly questioned the project’s sustainability. In June 2020, the Jokowi government began discussions with Japan to join the project and suggested integrating the Chinese-built HSR with a separate Japanese-funded railway project linking Jakarta and Surabaya along a different route. Some in the Indonesian Government argued that only by integrating the two projects could they both become economically viable. However, integration would be difficult as the Japanese-built section uses a different railway gauge and speeds. The restructuring of KCIC management and the appointment of a new chief executive in March 2021 have been interpreted as clear signs of the worsening financial outlook for the company. Adding to this, the following month, Indonesian SOEs also suggested that China take up a larger stake in the project to bear the cost overrun. This remains unresolved and, according to the corporate secretary of KCIC, who was quoted by Reuters in April 2021 Until now, details regarding additional unexpected costs are still being discussed and negotiated at the shareholder level. Also, consultations between the Government of Indonesia and China are continuing.’ According to an interview conducted by the author with one human resources manager, KCIC has employed a majority of local staff in the construction of the project, but top-level management is mostly dominated by Chinese expatriates, despite the fact the Indonesian side has a 60% share in the consortium. KCIC also claimed it has provided vocational training for domestic staff and local engineers to become the first HSR technicians’ in Southeast Asia. While generating more than 2,400 job opportunities, the project has faced multiple problems and technical challenges in its construction phase. In April 2016, vendors tasked by KCIC to carry out land investigations—including five Chinese nationals—were detained by the Indonesian Air Force for trespassing at the Halim Perdanakusuma Airport. In October 2019, a construction mishap caused Indonesia’s state-owned Pertamina oil pipeline to erupt in flames. In January 2020, the breach of an embankment allegedly caused by KCIC led to flooding in the West Bandung Regency. In March 2020, flooding caused by improper landfill and waste dumping blocked the Jakarta–Cikampek toll road, which is one of the busiest routes in the greater Jakarta region. These incidents have sparked public suspicion about the quality of the project’s technical assessment, given the environmental impact assessment AMDAL was completed in just seven days before the ground-breaking ceremony, according to NGO Walhi, which has been questioning the AMDAL submitted by KCIC since early 2016. Following the recent construction mishaps and environmental degradation caused by the project, Walhi staged a series of protests demanding the Indonesian Government and KCIC reassess the project, but they have been met with no response. The project continues without any further information being made public about plans to revisit the AMDAL or actions to minimise the risks. The land acquisition process has been no less problematic. Although KCIC secured a concession for the project in April 2016, progress was slow in the first two years. The inadequate preparation of land acquisition procedures and the involvement of ill-informed Chinese companies that overlooked the complexity of landownership in Indonesia have led to many controversies. There was a tendency on the part of the Chinese companies to assume public ownership of all land, as is the case in China. Moreover, the CDB made funding conditional on Indonesia securing all the land needed for the railway, making the delay even more challenging. Acquisition of land for the project finally reached 99% in late 2019, after the Indonesian Government intervened in the process. In-Depth Sources Belt and Road Podcast. 2021. Easy Money is Rarely Easy Jessica Liao on Infrastructure Financing and Export Credit Agencies.’ Belt and Road Podcast, 21 January. Link. Camba, Alvin. 2020. Derailing development China’s railway projects and financing coalitions in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. GCI Working Paper 008. Global Development Policy Center, Boston University. Link. Friends of the Earth US. 2017. Investing in a Green Belt and Road? Assessing the Implementation of China’s Green Credit Guidelines Abroad. Washington, DC Friends of the Earth US. Link in English; Link in Chinese. Liao, Jessica C. 2020. Easy Money and Political Opportunism How China and Japan’s High-Speed Rail Competition in Indonesia Drives Financially Risky Projects.’ Panda Paw Dragon Claw, 21 December. Link. Liao, Jessica C. and Saori N. Katada. 2020. Geoeconomics, Easy Money, and Political Opportunism The Perils under China and Japan’s High-Speed Rail Competition.’ Contemporary Politics 271 1–22. Lim, Guanie, Chen Li, and Emirza Adi Syailendra. 2021. Why Is It So Hard to Push Chinese Railway Projects in Southeast Asia? The Role of Domestic Politics in Malaysia and Indonesia.’ World Development 138. Link. Salim, Wilmar and Siwage Dharma Negara. 2016. Why is the high speed rail project so important to Indonesia? ISEAS PerspectiveNo. 16. Singapore ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. Link. Tritto, Angela. 2020. Contentious Embeddedness Chinese State Capital and the Belt and Road Initiative in Indonesia.’ Made in China Journal 51 182–87. Featured Image Credits muhammadpascalfajrin CC, on A high-speed train carries out a test run on the Jakarta-Bandung line in Tegalluar, Indonesia’s West Java province, last month. The railway had planned to begin a free trial with passengers in mid-August, but this could now be pushed back. Photo Antara Foto/Raisan Al Farisi via Reuters The 142km Jakarta-Bandung line, a high-profile belt and road project, is already US$ billion over its initial budget and four years behind schedule Indonesia’s transport ministry is now calling for the proposed commercial launch of the rail line to be pushed back from August this year to January Published 303pm, 7 Jun, 2023 Updated 312pm, 7 Jun, 2023 A high-speed train carries out a test run on the Jakarta-Bandung line in Tegalluar, Indonesia’s West Java province, last month. The railway had planned to begin a free trial with passengers in mid-August, but this could now be pushed back. Photo Antara Foto/Raisan Al Farisi via Reuters

high speed railway contractor consortium